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Jastrow, Münsterberg and the Automatograph 
 
Hannah Drayson (Plymouth, UK) 
 
In the 1890s, while director of the psychology laboratory at the University of Wis-
consin, Joseph Jastrow invented a psychological instrument he called the ‘automato-
graph’. It was a simple but highly sensitive mechanical device consisting primarily of 
two panes of glass lain on top of one another, separated by three brass ball bearings. 
By means of a scriber attached to the top pane, Jastrow used the automatograph to 
amplify and record onto a smoked glass plate or revolving drum the involuntary 
movements of a person's hand and arm.1 With a subject’s hand resting on the top 
pane of glass, and shielded from view with a curtain, Jastrow found that despite being 
given an instruction not to, subjects would move their hands in ways which they 
were unaware and in correspondence with the stimuli they were exposed to. For 
Jastrow the images obtained by the automatograph were evidence for the existence 
of involuntary, subconscious movement and the potential legibility of its instrumen-
tal records.2 
What Jastrow wrote about his experiments is intriguing. In an article in Popular 
Science Monthly, he stated that the device not only recorded “the direction of atten-
tion”, but because “thought is repressed movement”3 the recordings “illustrate in an 
imperfect way how abundant and intricate are the expressions of the thoughts that 
lie within.”4 That he referred to another form of ‘mind-reading’ – the popular enter-
tainment of muscle reading– as inspiration for the experiment confirms that Ja-
strow’s description of the machine as a mind-reading device was far from careless, 
or an overstatement to gain attention.5 While noting the difficulty of interpreting the 
complex squiggles that were derived from his experiments, his claim for the drawings 
is that they were inscriptions of thought.6 
Based on this understanding of the device’s output, Jastrow's contemporary 
Hugo Münsterberg made claims for the potential application of automatography in 
his book On the Witness Stand, “if a witness or a criminal in front of a row of a dozen 
men claims that he does not know any one of them, he will point on the automato-
graph, nevertheless, towards the man whom he really knows and whose face brings 
him thus into emotional excitement.”7 While in reality Münsterberg had mixed re-
sults with his forays into applying psychological techniques to legal cases8 what he 
was pointing out was that the tools of experimental psychology could be used to 
access the usually inaccessible realm of the soul, more usually the remit of human 
mediums and divinatory technologies. These connections were not without some 
powerful implications, this relation of inner thought to physiology influenced Mün-
sterberg’s student William Marston, who used blood pressure measurement for lie 
detection in his experiments.9  
Jastrow argued that “we are slow to appreciate that the sub-conscious and the 
involuntary find a common and a natural place amidst the soundly reasoned and aptly 
directed activities of our own intelligence”.10 In order to see through this tendency 
to overestimate our own “faith in the testimony of consciousness” he proposed the 
experiments using the automatograph as a “demonstration of the readiness with 
which perfectly normal individuals may be induced to yield visible evidence of un-
conscious and involuntary processes, that possesses a special interest; for when the 
naturalness of a few definite types of involuntary movements is made clear, the ap-
plication of the experience to more complex and more indefinite circumstances will 
easily follow”.11 
 Involuntary movements and their potential relation to unconscious or auto-
matic action have been– and remain– common tokens in debates about the relations 
and distinctions between self, soul, mind, brain, body and world. 12  As Wilma 
Koutstaal has pointed out, scientific investigations of automatic writing have reliably 
prompted reconsideration of the apparent distinctions between the psychical and 
physical, suggesting the question of whether we are always: 
“[…] too inclined to construe it as a purely motor or purely mental phe-
nomenon, avoiding any clear conception of a possible hinterland between 
the maximally and minimally intelligent. […] Do we want always to con-
nect symbolic activity to a self, to a coherent individuality, so that any ver-
sion of a disaggregation of consciousness or thought is aversive?”13 
In accessing, even amplifying, involuntary movements the automatograph functions 
as evidence and rhetorical device for different readings of the nature and relations of 
mind and matter, and self and experience. It offers one of many stories to be told 
about the adaptation of techno-cultural forms such as spiritualism, mesmerism and 
magic by experimental psychologists as they sought to establish themselves and their 
discipline in the United States,14  about how media technologies emerged from the 
work of inventors contributing equally to science, technology and popular culture.15 
Drawing on key texts which have explored the cultural trends of experimental 
psychology, particularly with regards to automaticity and deception, alongside pri-
mary sources from the period by Jastrow and his contemporaries, this chapter re-
flects on the context from which the device emerged. Situated between popular cul-
ture and psychology and provoking, or at least reifying, questions of the relationship 
between experience, will, and the self: a close look at the ideas that allow us to make 
sense of Jastrow’s understanding of the automatograph also reveals a long-lasting 
legacy in popular discussions of the cohesion of self and the testimony of conscious-
ness.  
 If we consider the automatograph as a scientific instrument, and therefore as 
an example of “reified theory”16, what is the theory that it embodies? According to 
Lisa Blackmann, automaticity (the experience of the involuntary that the device can 
be seen to enable) is best referred to as an “epistemic thing”17 which following Rhein-
berger “refer[s] to entities that escape fixation, and where there is always more to be 
said than any experimenter at any given moment is trying to tell.”18 As we will see 
the variety of arguments that were and remain attached to subconscious phenomena 
suggest that the device itself offers little constraint on the various interpretations of 
its meaning. Capable of carving up will, awareness and motor movement, the device 
helps to produce involuntary movements and offers to train its user in the feeling of 
involuntariness that are usually associated with dissociative phenomena, such as spirit 
possession, or multiple personalities. Despite this slipperiness in holding automatic-
ity to one or another interpretation, a willfully simple a reading of the automatograph, 
as Jastrow used it in his experiments, the device can be seen to offer a demonstration 
of how our bodies act in ways that we are not aware of, perhaps even against our 
will.  
The question of whether ‘we’ are, or can be deceived about our own wills also 
raises the question of where ‘we’ is best placed. As Karen Barad and Ian Hacking 
have both argued, scientific experiments have a productive effect,19 their relationship 
with the phenomena they describe is generative, within the context of the scientific 
laboratory, the objects of study are produced in a new way. For Hacking: 
“Nowhere outside of the laboratory is there such a pure arrangement. […] 
In nature there is just complexity, which we are remarkably able to analyse. 
We do so by distinguishing, in the mind, numerous different laws. We also 
do so, by presenting, in the laboratory, pure, isolated, phenomena.”20 
The protocols and tools of automatic movement whether in the séance or the labor-
atory offered a way to mediate knowledge of the movements of one’s own body, to 
isolate the phenomena of movement. While they did not create a potential that was 
not already there, they frame a potential orientation to, and understanding of self, 
that may not have been accessible without them. 
In 1894 Chicago instrument makers Garden City Model Works published a cat-
alogue of Jastrow's designs for psychological apparatus21. It advertises two versions 
of the automatograph. Both designs allowed the hand or arm to rest on a level sur-
face, or scriber, that offered little resistance to movement and so would shift around 
easily. The more substantial version of the device was made from two glass panes 
with three machined brass ball-bearings in-between them. Because of the minimal 
friction– the extremely even surfaces of the glass and regular shape of the ball bear-
ings– even the smallest involuntary movements of the resting hand would cause the 
top pane to move. These movements were marked by a glass scriber attached to the 
pane by a metal rod, which at the start of each experiment was dropped down onto 
a glass plate or revolving drum prepared with lamp-black. These inscriptions, which 
Jastrow called ‘automatograms’,22 could be fixed with ethanol and shellac to leave 
records of the hand’s movements that could be studied at leisure.23  
Tests reported by Jastrow involved a range of attention tasks, counting the 
beats of a metronome, watching a swinging pendulum, reading colours arranged in 
rows or printed text, or having the lab assistant hide an object somewhere in the lab 
and having the subject “think intently of the place of concealment.”24 Frictionless, 
the device freed the hand to shift around– enabling small movements that would 
otherwise remain unseen. According to Jastrow these movements would show the 
“direction of attention”25 – in a literal sense – following a subject’s eye movements 
as they followed the pendulum, or concentrated their attention on a particular place 
in the room where an object had been concealed.  
This experiment of hiding and revealing objects clearly references the “strik-
ing”26 exhibitions of muscle-reading that Jastrow notes as cause of dispute regarding 
whether subtle muscle movements were “sufficiently definite for the purposes of the 
‘mind-reader’”. He notes that while “many worthy and learned persons were abso-
lutely certain that they had given no indications whatever [...] the development of 
experimental research in the domain of psychology has made possible a variety of 
demonstrations of the truth and adequacy of this explanation.”27 The automatograph 
investigations acquired “visible records” of the involuntary movements that could 
explain the impressive demonstrations of the exhibiting mind-reader.28 
In his biography of Jastrow, Arthur Bluhmenthal described the automato-
graph as a “scientific-instrument version of the Ouija board.”29 It is not a great sur-
prise that Jastrow, a committed and outspoken opponent of spiritualism,30 was en-
gaged with scientific investigations in this area, as were many of his contemporaries, 
including William James and Hugo Münsterberg. 31  Heralded as an ‘ingenious 
method’ 32  by his student and colleague Clark Hull, Jastrow’s approach to the 
investigation clearly drew upon what was, by the 1890s, a long history of vociferous 
debate in the United Kingdom between physiologists, philosophers, spiritualist me-
diums, and the spiritualist press.33 William Benjamin Carpenter was a physiologist 
who from the 1850s penned articles attacking occult interpretations of the phenom-
ena associated with mediumship, particularly automatic writing, table turning and 
slate writing.34 Experiments made by Myers and Gurney and reported in the Journal 
of the Society for Psychical Research (S.P.R) in 1888 explored the problem of auto-
matic writing.35 Jastrow appears to be referencing Carpenter when he states that there 
are good arguments for the physiological explanation of involuntary movements, in-
cluding what Carpenter called ‘ideo-motor’ movement, “the involuntary response 
made by the muscles to ideas with which the mind may be possessed when the di-
recting power of the will is in abeyance.”36 It is likely that Jastrow was familiar with 
the works of the S.P.R (he was an original founder, with William James, of the Amer-
ican Society for Psychical Research – although he had left the society by 1890), as 
well as Carpenter's, given that he was a fellow critic of the claims of spiritualism. 
The similarity that Blumenthal was pointing out, was to the mobile part of the 
Ouija board known as the ‘planchette’ (from the French ‘little plank’). It was a small 
wooden board on three wheels or legs on which sitters would place their hands or 
fingertips during spiritualist séances. Responding to the unconscious hand move-
ments of the sitters, the device would often move around the table, sometimes pro-
ducing a text with an attached pencil, or pointing to letters marked on a Ouija Board. 
According to Sargent’s 1869 Planchette; Or the Despair of Science, the form taken by the 
planchette was reportedly the product of innovations in the practice of table rapping. 
This was the tedious protocol of calling out letters until a loud rap was heard. The 
‘planchette’ was the center of a considerable fad in households across France and the 
United States in the late 1860s.37 The interest and technical mindedness of scientific 
investigators that led to the calling out of letters to be replaced with the table pointing 
towards a written letter, and then the table itself being made smaller. The addition of 
wheels completed the planchette.38 The automatograph device that Jastrow produced 
was another stage in an ongoing collaboration between occultists and experimental 
science. 
In the 1860s Scientific American published an article calling for an investigation 
of those involuntary phenomena that “seem to indicate that the human body may 
become the medium for the transmission of force to inert and dead matter.”39 The 
medium's actions might be “in obedience to the will of others, or by the action of 
the nervous power upon the muscular system”40 but key was that “those through 
whom or from whom it emanates are totally unconscious of any exercise of volition, 
or of any muscular movement, as acts of their own wills.”41 Regardless of the source 
of the force– and the ontological ideas that it evidenced– the same constellations of 
unaware subject and apparently exterior or interior ‘other’ wills were to be found in 
table rapping and Ouija boards (the intervention of spirits), muscle reading (the in-
tervention of subconscious ideas), and mesmerism (the will of the mesmeriser, ex-
erted via animal magnetism or by suggestion). Intriguingly, the ‘transmission of force 
to dead matter’ suggests the editorial’s author was sensitive to a threshold between 
the living and base material world at which something new might come into being. 
What was key to all of these interpretations whatever the cause, is that the medium’s 
experience, was one of movement from elsewhere, a source unknown, or unverifia-
ble. 
Morton Prince's 1910 edited volume Subconscious Phenomena offers an overview 
of how the problem of the involuntary was understood by Jastrow and his contem-
poraries. In the hope that an “agreement in terminology might be reached”42 Prince 
identified key definitions of ‘subconscious’ from the contributions to the book. The 
three he takes from Hugo Münsterberg's essay are particularly useful. The first is the 
popular, or “layman’s” view; this is the idea that all minds are split into “upper and 
lower” or “waking and submerged selves”.43 In this the subconscious is an entire 
underlying and separate ‘I’. The second; the “physician's subconscious”,44 is patho-
logical in source, it’s signs include dissociative phenomena such as “the lost tactile 
sensations of anaesthesia” in automatic writing, hysterical catalepsy, and is caused by 
dissociated or repressed ideas or secondary selves that that may become dominant. 
His third type (to which he notes he would personally subscribe– at a push), is the 
“psychologist’s subconscious”, or “physiological subconscious”. This 
“can be best explained as pure neural processes unaccompanied by any 
mentation whatsoever. These phenomena become therefore pure phy-si-
ological organic processes of the body. The term subconscious thus be-
comes equivalent to the old theory of Carpenter’s ‘unconscious cerebra-
tion.’”45  
In this examination of Koutstaal’s “hinterland of the maximally and minimally intel-
ligent”46, Münsterberg argues that just as any perception is based on a physiological 
change, so the act of remembering may itself be physiological, a “fresh excitement 
of the brain.”47 When thoughts or new ideas occur to us, he asks, why should we 
consider them as necessarily requiring an accompanying psychical state? Even if the 
actions in question are “purposive and selective”48 there are many bodily systems 
that arguably make complex decisions: 
“When a body digests a meal, a hundred thousand cells are performing the 
most complex acts for the purposes of the organism, and they select the 
right chemical processes more safely than any chemist would be able to 
do; yet nobody presupposes that there is a mental interplay in the 
intestines. [...] have we any reason to expect less from the tissues of the 
central nervous system?”49 
While the position he develops is comparable with that of embodied mind theory in 
contemporary philosophy of mind, Münsterberg flatly denies the existence of a “lay-
man’s subconscious” an alternate mind or awareness: for him “there are no mental 
facts which go on outside of those which are in consciousness”50 because a mental 
fact is a priori a conscious experience. For Münsterberg it is at this point that the 
discussion moves into what he considers to be philosophical territory. Consciousness 
cannot be considered a scientific object and the psychical realm should not be con-
fused with that of the objective, material world that concerns scientific psychology. 
Rather than consider consciousness as off limits, Morton Prince was eager to 
indeed “presuppose […] a mental interplay in the intestines.”51 In the penultimate 
chapter of Subconscious Phenomena– which gives him what is more or less the last word– 
he argues for a pan-psychist view: “there is no distinction to be made between con-
scious processes and brain processes of a certain order, excepting as a point of view. 
They become identified one with the other. The psychical is the reality of the physi-
cal.”52 Prince takes a different view on the issue of whether thought and awareness 
are related. Even if they are not consciously reported, can we be sure that thoughts, 
or something approaching mentation are not there?53 For him the problems sur-
rounding the question of what automaticity meant to an understanding of the mind 
was caused by a general failure of “understanding how we can have states of con-
sciousness of which we are unaware”54 and stemmed from how awareness and 
thought were represented. 
“Consciousness is represented as a functioning unity, and it is difficult to 
accept the notion that all states of consciousness are not so synthesized as 
to form part of that great system which we dub self-consciousness. […] 
We find it difficult to conceive of a conscious state that is not part of a 
self-conscious self […] a state of consciousness, a sensation, a perception, 
an idea floating off – so to speak – by its lonesome self and not attached 
to anything that can be called a self.”55 
Prince's words draw attention to the importance of how self and will are framed 
within the discussion of automaticity, with the result that these expectations are dis-
appointed; 
“It is difficult to conceive of anything worthy of the being called a sensa-
tion or perception, excepting so far as there is a self to experience it; and 
yet it really is a naïve conception to imagine that we are self-conscious of 
each and every conscious state that is aroused in correlation without [sic] 
nervous system.”56 
Despite his apparent denial of the psychical, it is worth noting here that Münster-
berg’s position in the discussion was equally nuanced in terms of its understanding 
of consciousness and awareness. He asks his reader to imagine that their mind were 
“[…] wandering in a tiresome lecture, where one might become concerned 
with one’s own inner problems and for a while, the words of the speaker 
fade to the edge of the conscious field. One might come back to this 
awareness, still being able to remember having been in the room, and fo-
cus back, even remembering what has been said. Or the stimulus of the 
voice becomes so low in awareness that it slips out, but then it does not 
become the realm of the subconscious, but that of the merely physiologi-
cal, the excitement of the neural structures associated with listening no 
longer excite the sensorium to bring the sound into awareness.”57 
As Münsterberg indicates, the psychologist’s subconscious or something approach-
ing it, had been in currency for some time. He refers to Benjamin Carpenter’s term 
“unconscious cerebration”.58 Already in 1852, Carpenter had exhaustively detailed 
involuntary phenomena and argued that they were evidence of non-conscious 
thought and bodily, reflex action.59 However, for Carpenter and many of his con-
temporaries, the theological implications of this materialist– or at least monist– per-
spective meant that his arguments could not be entertained, they were in fact impli-
cated in a long history of ideas that had been actively repressed. 
According to Reed, from as early as the 1740s the study of reflex actions had 
raised theological problems about the soul and where it might be found. When Rob-
ert Whytt discovered the spinal reflexes, and their regulation of ‘intricate bodily func-
tions’60 such as breathing, it suggested that at least some part of the soul must reside 
in the spinal cord, for how otherwise was the motivation and control of these func-
tions achieved? As Reed explains, viewed within the long history of physiological 
exploration that that followed these discoveries the 
“[…] idea of a soul or mind that is distributed throughout the spine and 
perhaps even throughout the body (as opposed to being locked inside the 
skull) forms a kind of counterpoint to mainstream psychological and phys-
iological thought.”61 
A “distributed soul” was, for many “dangerously close to the ‘animal’ aspects of the 
world, and tended to make the soul indistinguishable from our viscera.”62 Hence the 
context within which the aforementioned discussions were taking place was one in 
which a monist perspective that collapsed mental and physical was off limits. Instead, 
Reed argues, the ‘new psychology’ developed a dualistic view that, “instead of op-
posing mind and body, separated the ‘conscious mind (the true self) and unconscious 
mind (affected by forces ‘outside’ the soul, including the body).”63 Along with phys-
iological studies of the reflexes, automatic writing and involuntary movement (as 
demonstration of unconscious thinking) could all be counted as evidence for the idea 
that some aspect of psychical life might take place outside of conscious awareness. 
Reed argues that many scholars concerned with the history of psychology have 
expected, and therefore found a materialism that was not there.64 As psychology 
formed its disciplinary boundaries, and the study of the soul became the study of the 
mind, one might imagine that the motivation was an increasingly secular, and ascend-
ant, materialist worldview. But Reed’s history shows, the scientists involved main-
tained religious beliefs which required that at least some part of the mind, like the 
soul, remained an inviolable entity, separate from the matter of the body, or the 
physiological subconscious. Despite Carpenter's insistence on a material and physi-
ological understanding of the involuntary, and his opposition to spiritualism, he did 
not discount the soul at all, but instead worked to separate the automatic mind from 
the conscious mind and thus maintain a world-view that could incorporate both psy-
chology and his Unitarian Christian beliefs.65 
Bearing in mind this debate, we might now turn to how the problems of the 
unitary self had an influence on way in which psychology was popularized. Jastrow 
(like Münsterberg) had a long and successful career promoting an appreciation of the 
new science of scientific psychology in the American press. His reports on the au-
tomatograph were only a small part of extensive publishing activity, reaching a wide 
popular audience through publishing, press, radio and public lecture tours. In 1893 
Jastrow served as head of the psychological section of the World's Fair Columbian 
Exposition in Chicago, curating a display of instruments from across Europe, pre-
senting the ‘new psychology’ for the first time to a large audience and collecting a 
mass of experimental data from the visiting public.66 According to his 1944 obituary 
in Science Jastrow had  “an extraordinarily facile pen”67; he wrote for Cosmopolitan, 
Harpers Monthly, and Popular Science Monthly,68 had a syndicated newspaper column ti-
tled Keeping Mentally Fit, and hosted a show in New York on NBC radio from 1935 
to 1938. 
Jastrow focused much effort on making psychology useful to everyday people, 
in “a program that aimed to instruct how to wisely navigate the world of appearances 
[…] the cultivation of a critical attitude to combat habits that directed perception 
onto the easy path of self-deception.”69 His focus therefore involved explaining how 
psychology could aid in self-monitoring of actions and beliefs; and advising the pub-
lic on how they might avoid being deluded or manipulated, particularly by the “frauds 
and fakery of mind reading, telepathy, feats of magic, Spiritism, and religious cults.”70 
He penned a number of self-help manuals, including Piloting your Life, the Psychologist 
as Helmsman, as well as a list of mildly condescending titles that explored the psychol-
ogy of deception; Fact and Fable in Psychology; The Psychology of Conviction: A Study of 
Beliefs and Attitudes; Wish and Wisdom, Episodes in the Vagaries of Belief; The Betrayal of 
Intelligence; a Preface to Debunking, and an edited volume titled Story of Human Error.71 
He also reviewed books by supporters of spiritualism and his committed opposition 
was such that in the 1920s he booked and gave lectures following each date on Oliver 
Lodge’s tour of the United States, provide counter arguments to Lodge’s claims.72 
According to Michael Pettit, many activities and debates in the formation of 
experimental psychology in the US were influenced by more general public concern 
with deception. The nineteenth century was a time in which the effects of urbanisa-
tion and industrialisation began to divorce people from the usual social structures 
that maintained trust.73 One of Petit’s examples is branding; in an increasingly anon-
ymous market, the branding of food and medical products allowed consumers to 
identify that products they were buying were from trusted and recognised sources. 
As competing businesses made use of similarity to evoke similar recognition in cus-
tomers, the question of how to define and protect one’s brand arose. These were 
issues that psychologists were able to tackle with scientific insights regarding percep-
tion, resemblance and belief.74 
 One obvious way the theme of deception made its way into the laboratory was 
the work psychologists did recreating and perfecting illusionistic and deceptive phe-
nomena in order to make apparent possible failures of the human perceptual and 
reasoning systems. Jastrow performed creative and intricate experiments with visual 
illusions, and phenomena such as stereoscopic vision.75 Experiments using weights 
disguised as other materials or that confused the relation of size to weight (to show 
the influence of expectation on how objects were perceived) were carefully designed 
to mislead participants. Based on tools from the commercial magic show, they used 
experiments which “built on the legacy of stage magic”76 by reproducing its appa-
ratus, technique and rhetoric. 
 At the time these influences were far from hidden; Jastrow was an acquaint-
ance of magician Harry Houdini, who made guest appearances at the former’s psy-
chology lectures which were otherwise known for being usually “dull” “windbag” 
affairs77; and in 1888 Jastrow invited two well-known sleight-of-hand magicians into 
his laboratory to experimentally test their powers of perception.78 In marked similar-
ity with the approach taken by the psychological community to these matters, Hou-
dini was well known for structuring his performances around the debunking of 
fraudulent mediums and others who claimed to have occult powers.  
Pettit points out the irony of this rupture with the long-standing tradition of 
the introspecting gentleman scientist as honest witness; psychological subjects were 
redefined as misguided and potentially untrustworthy.79 Remarking that in an early 
collaborative experiment between C.S. Pierce and Jastrow exploring subliminal 
changes in weight perception, he explains that the pair modeled their understanding 
of their subjects not on the “honest” and “transparent observer” required for exper-
iments that required introspection but on the “unsavory gambler trying to best a 
game of chance. As in the automatograph experiments, they separated the observer 
from the experimenter by a screen”.80 
 In this view, the phenomena of involuntary movement was interpreted as ev-
idence of the failure of individual perception and self-control. It offered testimony 
for the usefulness of experimental psychology by showing that it’s methods could 
reveal previously hidden aspects of an individual’s behaviour. Jastrow and Münster-
berg also took pains to argue that the phenomena were an entirely normal and eve-
ryday part of functioning. As Jastrow argued: “We are slow to appreciate that the 
sub-conscious and the involuntary find a common and a natural place amidst the 
soundly reasoned and aptly directed activities of our own intelligence.”81 The record-
ing of involuntary movements offered “a demonstration of the readiness with which 
perfectly normal individuals may be induced to yield visible evidence of unconscious 
and involuntary processes,”82 the automatograph showed that anyone, whoever they 
might be, could be demonstrably unaware of their own motor actions. In a way that 
was in equal parts compelling and troubling, it appeared to reveal the both conscious 
and unconscious thoughts within. 
As early as 1910 Münsterberg had argued that it was a misplaced expectation 
of the unity of conscious experience that made apparently subconscious phenomena 
appear so problematic.83 The expectation of ‘clarity’ and constancy in one’s memory 
is belied, he argued, by any observation of our own changes in disposition as we 
move between different social contexts, with our family, at the office, or at a party, 
in each case we access different groups of “associations, memories, emotions and 
impulses”84. These effortless and unconscious adjustments of expectation and char-
acter have marked effects on our responses and understanding of what we encounter 
in these different contexts. Levels of awareness, attention and memory all are modi-
fied, but rather than switching between different separate ‘minds’ the issue is one of 
memory integration. Münsterberg describes an example scenario: someone sleep-
walks at night and writes a letter, but does not remember doing it. There is no reason 
to suppose that the writer of the letter is not conscious of writing the letter at the 
time. It is only later, if they do not remember, that the story of personal awareness is 
broken.85 
Despite the vintage of the discussion, the problem of misplaced expectations 
about the unity of self-consciousness and self-control still feature in popular writing 
in the contemporary cognitive sciences. In The Illusion of Conscious Will, Daniel Wegner 
uses a range of experimental evidence from the long study of deception and self-
deception in psychology to argue that the experience of conscious will is not always 
causally connected to action.86 Wegner includes Jastrow's experiments87 alongside 
many others exploring involuntary phenomena, showing the ease with which exper-
imental subjects can be made to feel that they are doing something when they are 
not88 or influenced by subliminal stimuli.89 Based on this evidence, he suggests that 
action and the feeling of action are not in actuality causally related to one another. 
One of the most famous (although now somewhat vintage) experiments in 
this vein was reported by Benjamin Libet in Behavioural and Brain Sciences in 1985 and 
explored the neurophysiological correlates of decision-making. Libet measured the 
time between a brain signal (a readiness potential), and the moment at which a subject 
reported being aware that they had decided to act. The results showed that when a 
subject is asked to push a button at random intervals, their brains showed readiness 
to act before they were conscious of having decided, a gap of around 550 millisec-
onds. Libet argued that the experience of consciously willed action was after-the-
fact, and consequently the feeling that action was instigated by conscious will an 
illusion. This raised a considerable debate on the notion and nature of ‘free will’, 
given that apparently voluntary actions appeared to be coming from a source desig-
nated different from the self, or at least the experience of it, the brain. The tag-line 
being that experience, feeling or consciousness were not causally implicated in what 
happened or what people did; they were simply its results. 
The moment has now passed for interrogating Libet’s claims, but it is worth 
noting that among the huge volume of commentary on his experiment, even in its 
original publication.90 A particular criticism was the dualistic perspective required to 
make the claim that an action carried out by a person’s own hand was not carried out 
by them. Like Carpenter and his contemporaries, whether through imperative or 
habit, the tendency to willfully expect and interpret a unity of self, resulted in a par-
adoxical appearance of division.  
The example provided by Libet’s experiment became highly influential in pop-
ular psychology, the mystery of consciousness was no longer an issue of ‘how’ but 
‘why’? Why are we deluded to think that we are somehow running a show at which 
we are merely spectators in something that Daniel Dennett called a ‘benign user illu-
sion’?91 Wegner’s book poses this question, and he finally, as Libet did, tries to sneak 
consciousness back into play. In an attempt to account for some kind of function of 
the experience of will, Libet suggested that conscious awareness was the feeling of 
the ability to veto ‘involuntary’ actions that had been begun.92 Differently, Wegner 
suggested that the feeling of will might assist individuals in the tracking and moni-
toring the effectiveness of their own actions: 
“Even though conscious will does not signal the actual occurrence of 
mental causation, it serves as a hint that such causation is happening. Each 
surge of will we feel accrues very quickly into our overall experience of 
effectiveness and achievement. Admittedly, this experience of will can be 
mistaken.”93 
Throughout these discussions therefore runs a track of ambivalence towards the ar-
gument that experimental evidence offers a ‘true’ reading of one's own experience 
and actions. Perhaps Jastrow and Münsterberg were not making such sensational 
claims (although, as we have seen, at the time the physician’s subconscious was a 
more contentious a proposition). However, they were both concerned with estab-
lishing how psychology could correct common misconceptions about the reliability 
of experiences of will, agency and self. 
Wegner’s discussion uncomfortably seems perpetually dogged by the Cartesi-
anism of his forbears, for while he notes the importance of the embodied mind, he 
then continues to try to account for the results of the many experiments that demon-
strate that people often confabulate false reasons for acting that were manipulated in 
laboratory conditions outside of their awareness. The impossibility is not the sepa-
rateness of conscious will from action, it is that “willed action” itself can be expected, 
or even possible. If we are worried about the feeling of loss of will, should we not 
first ask ourselves when and how we do experience consciously wiling and acting? 
Arguably, it may only be when we are asked to reflect, either during, or after making 
a decision, in which case, the feeling of will is an experimental artifact, not a disorder 
of awareness.  
From this perspective these problems are generated by sleight of hand. The 
need to keep materialism under wraps, and the mind as an inviolate and bounded 
‘self’ seems to have resulted in a way of talking about people that lends itself to this 
conjuring trick, variations of which are played repeatedly on the borders of psychol-
ogy and popular culture. The talk of illusions of self may perhaps be more a way to 
attract an audience to the real question that Wegner’s book raises, of how these var-
iations on experiences of will are produced. He asks about this in relation to Libet’s 
experiment, which he argues measures the ability to report on one’s own actions, not 
act.94 It is worth noting that the way in which the technical device inserts itself be-
tween the testimony of experience, the machine’s inscription and the psychologist– 
as engaged in producing ‘benevolent’ illusions– places experimental psychology in 
the position of mediator and corrector of experience.  
However, Wegner also suggests another perspective that we might consider, 
regarding practices in which experience of will are manipulated as culturally inten-
tional; in which, arguably they may make people more ‘free’, despite the fact that they 
appear to be ‘deluding’ themselves. 
“Several anthropologists have suggested that this ‘alibi’ theory might ac-
count for the finding that spirit possession occurs most often among peo-
ple are oppressed in their culture – usually the women. The belief in spirits 
is not just the sharing of a fairy story, but instead is a useful fiction.”95 
In this sense, which Lisa Blackman has also pointed out,96 self-understanding can be 
cybernetic, as ‘useful fictions’ are incorporated into thoughts, action and possibility.  
Regarding this, Blackman cites as an example experiments exploring automatic 
writing (some of which used a form of the automatograph)97 made in Münsterberg's 
Lab by Leon Solomons and Gertrude Stein while they were graduate students.98 
These experiments, well-known because of Stein’s literary fame, explored the abilities 
of ‘normal’ individuals to shape and direct attention by engaging in various automatic 
writing tasks. Like their professor, the two argued that the ability to undertake these 
tasks was part of normal mental functioning.99 They set out to confirm that there 
was only one stream of consciousness involved in the production of writing and that 
apparently dissociative behaviors were achieved by rapid switching. However, further 
to this hypothesis confirmation, Stein’s involvement with the experiment (with her-
self as subject) was to explore the cultivation of individual ability in automatic writing 
and dissociative ability.100 
Tim Armstrong suggests that this orientation towards “intervention” was cen-
tral to the period; “[...] characterized by the desire to intervene in the body; to render 
it part of modernity by techniques which may be biological, mechanical, or behav-
ioural.” Of course, he says, “The idea of intervention – implying a causality, a direct 
relation – is a difficult one.”101 Understanding how debates around involuntary 
movement could have come to change experience and ability is complex. However 
while Stein’s work can be seen as quite directly proposing a certain idea about oper-
ations on the self, both voluntary and involuntary, Armstrong points out that, Mün-
sterberg's various activities, “exposing a medium; administering the first electric lie-
detector test; as a pioneering industrial psychologist testing individuals for their suit-
ability for different types of work; as a writer on advertising, and author of the first 
major psychological study on film” testified to his concern with “the calibration of 
the human physiological apparatus in relation to the crisis of modernity.”102 
This ‘calibration of the human physiological apparatus’ could suggest a rather 
instrumental approach to the psychological subject, but it must be noted that both 
Münsterberg and Jastrow103 were critical of many of the tendencies of the psychology 
that grew up in their wake. When discussing the interaction between conscious 
awareness and subconscious actions, Jastrow is clear that he sees conscious aware-
ness as central, as a 
“director of conduct […] activities in which consciousness plays the lar-
gest part are those that give distinction to the intellectual life; its reflective, 
centralizing leadership permeates the vast and complex organization of 
the psychic functions.”104 
The importance, for Jastrow is in the balance between involuntary and directed, the 
“greatest good of the whole requires equally that the control shall not be 
relaxed and the direction of affairs left to the unvarying routine of undis-
cerning subordinates, and that the director shall not insist upon a partici-
pation in the work which others should be trained to do, or interfere with 
efficient service by and intimidating or distrustful oversight of the perfor-
mance of his subordinates. It is not advantageous to be a mere bundle of 
habits; but it is a real advantage to have them and to use them.”105 
Here the mind is self-aware and also served by many other ‘psychic functions’. A 
“vocal anti-behaviorist”,106 Jastrow's belief in psychology was in its ability to grant 
individual freedom through self-awareness and insight. Pintar and Lynn have sug-
gested that Jastrow’s work in the self-help literature is also, paradoxically connected 
with automaticity through his studies of hypnosis as applied out-side of the labora-
tory.107 They point toward a persistent influence on the work of those who followed; 
for example Milton Erikson, who while a student at Wisconsin was advised by Ja-
strow while devising his experiments in hypnosis.108 Erikson later became known for 
developing a form of indirect hypnotism oriented around what he called “utilization 
theory”109 which aimed to make use of patient’s own skills, attributes and ideas, ra-
ther than impose change upon them.110 
In showing people acting when they thought they were not, the automato-
graph experiments supported Jastrow and Münsterberg’s idea that normal individuals 
could benefit from the assistance, and technological mediation, of experimental psy-
chology. This relation has persisted in popular engagement with psychology, which 
presents the failure to identify mind and mental experience as a unity as a problematic 
mystery, rather than a well understood fact. The discussions held by Jastrow and 
others about the ontological implications of involuntary movement clearly suggested 
that if it was to be considered part of the conversation at all, mind might better be 
thought of as something embedded or extended throughout the body. However, as 
Edwin Reed’s historical studies show, the long-standing wider cultural resistances to 
the notion of soul within the material plane carried a persistent dualism. The resulting 
effect being the requirement that discourses in the sciences devised bounded realms 
of conscious and subconscious. The result seems to have been that experiments in-
volving involuntary movements retained their power as problems for understanding 
science and the self. As a side effect of this the importance of the young discipline 
of psychology was maintained, offering authority at a moment in time where religious 
belief was losing ground and offering it the paradoxical role of mediator between 
people and themselves. 
By simply shielding the hand and giving it a vehicle on which to ride the au-
tomatograph could be used to carve up will, awareness, and bodily movement. In 
many arenas these separations, and the stories told about them offer an experience 
of the uncanny. In any conjuring trick the audience is led to form an expectation 
about the state of the world: there is nothing up the sleeve, no rabbits inside the hat. 
We are told we should experience a unity of self, and agency that is incompatible 
with what the machine seems to show, and then asked, to actively engage in trying 
to voluntarily account for an experience of our actions. Engaging with this useful 
fiction involved Jastrow, Münsterberg and their contemporaries involved in a com-
plex dance between the new science of psychology and its manifestations in popular 
culture. While their investigations excited and explored apparently mysterious phe-
nomena, these scientists could not really be said to have perpetuated the idea of a 
‘ghost in the machine’ but all-the-same they benefitted from the compelling nature 
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